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A Ttle of Jo.,.., Hanford still uses steam for heating and processing activities, utilizing over 20 miles of piping distribution systems similar to those found in industry. Although these aging systems are still sound, they cannot stand up to the extreme pressure pukes developed by a condensation induced water hammer.
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COMPLETE THIS SECVON ONL Y FOR A SPEECH OR pRfSENTA TION
CONDF.NSATION INDUC ED WATER HAMME R PHENOMENON
A condensation induced water hammer (CIWH) is a phenomenon which occurs when steam is either allowed to enter into a piping system that contains water (condensate), or conversely when water isinjected intoapiping system thatcontains steam. Thecombmation of thecondensing action attiestetiwater interface mdtieflow ofsteaover thewater till cause waves to fem. These waves will grow until they reach the whole cross 'oid section of thepipe, which traps steam between the wavepeaks asshownin Figurel. Oncethe steam is trapped, rapid condensation takes place at the interface, which collapses the steam volume. These implosions coupled with the velocity of the Wave Pfx#Jypation steam flow, create incredible pressure pulses which can reach several thousand pounds pressure, and have catastrophic results.
Our introduction to the CIWH phenomena took place in what is known as the 300 Area of the Hanford Site. Stea Utilities persomel weregoing toreconfigure anexisting valve lineup in preparation forasteam outage toafacility.
300 Areasteam issupplied from a central powerhouse which hasseveral export lines that form alooped steanl system. This allows isolation ofone facility without disrupting service to other facilities.
Steam pressure in the 300 Area is 125 psig, and the temperature is at saturation, or about 350"F. A large portion of the steam lines in this system are underground, with valving stations located in pit areas. It was one such valving station that was the location of our accident -the U3 Pit(see Figure 2) . The U3pitcontains four valves. MSS-25and MSS-27are 8'' steam supply valves from the looped powerhouse system, MSS-26 is a 4" steam isolation valve to a facility, and then there was one 6" valve that was blanked off for finure expansion of the system.
The plan was to close MSS-27 so that maintenance could be conducted on that part of the system, and reroute steam through MSS-25. MSS-25 is normally opened, however, it was closed 8 months earlier for a steam outage. After that outage was completed, it was decided that MSS-25 would remain closed because of the hazards involved in re-opening it. First, it required entry into a cofilned space, second, there was a possibility that asbestos was present, and third, steam pits such as this typically exceed 140"F. Steam however, was restored to the entire looped system after that outage, so that although closed, MSS-25 had Around 7:00 o'clock on the everring of June 7th, the operations crew began the task of reconfiguring the system. A plant operator entered the U3 pit and unlocked MSS-25, and began to unseat the valve. The crew outside the pit entrance saw some condensate discharge from the steam trap (to a french drain), however, atier a short time, it , appcaed tostop. The operator in the pit continued (1 to open the valve, and a few moments later, there was a loud "bang", followed by the expulsion of steam, rock, and debris ffom the pit. Amazingly, the operator was able to exit the pit on his own adrenaline, but he was so severely burned (internal and external) that he died a few days later from his Figure  2 injuries.
Lets look at what actually happened here. s!-Tmp
Although it was understood that there would be Vem some condensate accumulated in tlont of MSS-25, it was not known how much condensate was actually present. The pipe upstream of MSS-25 was 840 feet long, and was sloped downward approximately 13 feet towards the U3 pit, and it was calculated that the 8" line was tilled with approximately 1,500 gallons of subcooled (550F) condensate. As the operator began to open up the valve, the condensate moved up the vertical pipe until it reached the horizontal section, where it flowed both concurrently and courrtercumently with the steam flow (see Figure 3 ). This action Figure  3 coupled with the rapid condensation of the steam at the stear-dwater interface resulted in a violent CIWH. Pressure pulses estimated at 2,300 lbf7in2 found the weakest link in the system, which was the6 inch cast iron valved that was blanked off (see Figure 4) . The valve separated at the flange, and the resulting steam flow excavated a large hole adjacent to the pit (see Figure 5 ).
AN ISOLATED INCI DENT?
Our accident in 1993 at Hanford was our first experience with a CIWH phenomenon of thk magnitude.
When we attempted to obtain more~. , information, we found that it was both difficult to Figure  4 get, or in most cases, non-existent.
Why is this? Those who have suffered serious water hammer events in the past are reluctant to talk about it let rdone write about it, because of the sensitivity of the subject and the legal issues and implications. Today however, due to improved networking within our industry, information on CIWH and it's prevention is available to those who need it or want it. However, this information doesn't always reach those who need it most -our steam systems operators. The following examples illustrate thk point.
In October of 1986, there was a major CIWH accident at the U.S. Department of Energy's Brookhaven National Laboratory. The crew was involved in placing a newly constructed steam line into service.
Due to a combination of poor procedures and training, plus installation of an improperly sized steam trap, a CIWH was experienced when workers attempted to drain the accumulated condensate from the pressurized steam system. Four workman were injured in the accident, two of them fatally. Investigations were conducted, and reports were written, but few outside of Brookhaven ever saw it.
In August of 1989, less than a hundred miles from Brookhaven, in a place called Gramercy Park, New York, Con-Edison workers, using reachrods, were placing a steam system back into service which had been down for only 8 hours. A catastrophic CIWH occurred which blew out an expansion joint. They had failed to remove the accumulated condensate in the piping system before they opened the 20" valve on the 185 psig steam system. Two workers and one pedestrian were killed in the explosion. A short time later a video tape was produced which clearly explained the water hammer accident and how it could have been prevented. Again, few steam system workers outside of Con Edison ever saw this informative tape. Workers like Jack Smith.
In June, 1991, at a Georgia campus hospital, a fellow by the name of Jack Smith was restoring a looped 85 psig steam system to service. Jack had probably performed this task several times in the past and maybe he even experienced minor water hammers because the system had been modified earlier so that accumulated condensate could not be fully drained from the system. When Jack opened up the 8 inch valve, steam bubbles moved under the valve seat, and began collapsing violently with the water on the other side of the valve and a catastrophic CIWH occurred. They found Jack's body at the bottom of the pit, under 2 and 1/2 feet of hot condensate, with the fractured valve body above him. An article was published in "Heating, Piping, and Air Conditioning", where the author, after describing the accident, asks the question; "Could this happen again?" He answers "yes", and then in June of 1993, we had our accident at Hanford which resulted in one fatality.
LESSONS LEARNED !"''.:xllxmxm'---'
I -So what have we learned from these and other CIWH accidents? First. condensation induced water hammer is potentially fataL Secondly, CIWH'S in a piping system is not acceptable and is preventable. Tbird, steam trapsizirrg, operation, md B maintenance play animportarrt roll inthe prevention of a CIWH. Finally, we learned that you cannot safely drain accumulated condensate from a charged 4 steam system without risking a CIWH. our ! corrective actions required us to find a way to get our workers to focus on preventing a water hammer BEFORE they ever put their hand on a valve wheel. ] We provided this focus in what we call the "Safety Principle" which states: "Steam and water can not be safely mixed in a piping system without .-=----risking Condensate Induced Water Hammer, Do not mix steam with water either by injecting water into a steam system or steam into a system that includes water (condensate). Condensate should be assumed to be in all low points and dead legs until proven otherwise." In order to reinforce the philosophy bebind the safety principle, we provided several recommendations: Operators and maintenance workem need to walk doum their systems 10 ensure that traps are workins properly and repair or replace defective traps.
Using the method of "cmckins" open a steam valve to remove excess condensate, will not protect you from a condensation induced water hammer.
Valves in pipe lines which lack properly positioned steam traps should remain open at all times or preferably should be removed from the piping system, Otherwise, install traps at these locations.
UsinS reach rods (extension linkage) is a gowd practice, but will not always protect you from the forces of a water hammer event.
Steam pipins systems should be inspected for sagsing, Where necessary, install steam traps at these locations, or repair the sagsing.
Check and repair piping insulation. h will save energy, and reduce the accumulation of excess condensation in the piping system, Activation of cold pipirg should be performed slowly (usins bypass valves if available) at reduced pressure, with blecdvalves (Mudlegs) continuously open until the piping reaches system pressures and temperatures.
Placement of blowdmvn \,aIves before and after a wnical rise is required to prevent possible condensate accumulation, These recommendations should be followed regardless of pipins size. Do not exclude small pipe sizes without an appropriate analysis.
Finally, and I believe most imporw.mly, improperly designed steam systems shrmld "ot have the i"comect fr,atures overcome by operational methods. Systems musl ha~,e their incorrect features corrected. coNCLUSIOÑ ereisatime bomboutthere ticKngin owNatiom steasystems today. Where orwhen it will gooffagain isdifficult to say. Weonlyknow that ifwecontinue thepractice of mixing steam and water (condensate) in our piping distribution systems, it will happen again. We are however, begiming toseesome progress inoureffotis toraiseawweness. At Hanford's Steam Utilities, we have not experienced a CIWH event for almost three years, and we routinely place miles ofstearn piping systems inrmdoutofservice.
Industry isawakening also. Wehave received calls from dozens of Utilities, Universities, and other industrial users of steam, telling us about their water hammers, and wanting information and/or training on how to prevent them.
I have had the opportunity and privilege to take this message out across the United States. I have found that in general, steam system workers including engineers, planners, operators, maintenance personnel, andmanagement alike are eager to learn, buthave never been given the oPPo*tY. Very few were awme of the potentially destructive power of this phenomenon and most had never heard of the accidents discussed in this article. But as I listen to them describe some of the events that they have experienced in they're own plants, it becomes apparent that we have hundreds if not thousands of CIWH events each year in this country. Most just result in banging in the piping systems, a few result in more serious accidents. The only way to eliminate this type of catastrophic event from happening again, is by training and educating our workforce of the potential hazards of a CIWH, and to maintain our steam systems to ensure they are sound and capable of draining all of the water out. In just these few accidents that I described today, tens of millions of dollars have been spent in damages and corrective actions.
Our conclusion is simple. Condensation induced water hammers are fatally serious. They should never be acceptable in our piping systems, and they are preventable when basic operational and engineering principles are applied.
